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     JUDY DICK,* (J.D. #16); 
     VALERIE ZYSKOWSKI,* (J.D. #60); 
     JANET COCCHI, (J.D. #12); and 
     MARY BEDDINGFIELD, (J.D. #7) 
       (*Pursuant to Rule 12(a), 
         F.R.A.P.), 
        Appellants 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 91-cv-00316) 
___________________ 
 
 
Argued March 7, 1995 
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(Filed July 18, 1995) 
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*The Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Judicial 
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 For claims subject to federal statutes of limitations, commencement of a class 
action tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class, but upon 
denial of class certification, the tolling period ends.  In this appeal we must decide 
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would continue the tolling period of a state 
statute of limitations beyond a district court's denial of class certification until 
appeals of that denial are exhausted.  We also must decide whether Rule 15(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would permit relation back of an amendment to a pleading 
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that names new plaintiffs after expiration of the statute of limitations when those new 
plaintiffs are neither substituted nor have shown mistake concerning identity.  We will 
affirm the order of the district court dismissing plaintiffs' claims. 
I. 
 On March 11, 1989, anti-abortion protestors demonstrated on the grounds of a 
private clinic in Pittsburgh and blocked patient access to the facility.  Pittsburgh 
police arrested about sixty female protestors and took them to a city holding facility 
until their transfer to the Allegheny County jail.  They were detained overnight and 
released the next day. 
 On February 21, 1991 -- eighteen days short of the two-year anniversary of the 
protest -- this lawsuit was filed, as a class action by a representative on behalf of all 
the women arrested and by four protestors asserting individual claims.  The lawsuit 
alleges that the city and county and their employees, through their actions in arresting 
and detaining the women, violated the protestors' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The district court denied a motion for certification of a plaintiff class on November 22, 
1991.  Eighteen days later, on December 10, the protestors filed a third amended complaint 
that included two more women asserting individual claims. 
 After the passage of two more years, and five years after the demonstration at 
issue, the protestors filed a fourth amended complaint on March 17, 1994.  This latest 
complaint named five of the six women who had previously asserted individual claims (one 
woman chose voluntarily to dismiss her claims) and added two more plaintiffs, Janet Cocchi 
and Mary Beddingfield. On May 31, 1994, two additional protestors, Judy Dick and Valerie 
Zyskowski, filed a joint motion to intervene as party plaintiffs. 
 Defendants then moved to dismiss the claims of Cocchi and Beddingfield and to 
strike the motion of Dick and Zyskowski to intervene.  The district court granted the 
                     
0The protestors also asserted various other claims that the district court dismissed.
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motions, holding that the four women's claims were barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations.  Cocchi, Beddingfield, Dick, and Zyskowski appeal. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction of this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) 
and § 1343(a)(3)-(a)(4) (1988).  We have jurisdiction if the district court's orders 
constitute "final decisions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).  The determination that 
appellants' claims are barred by the statute of limitations is a final and reviewable 
decision.  See Green V. Humphrey Elevator & Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1987) ("order dismissing the complaint in the instant action is final and thus reviewable 
. . . because the statute of limitations on appellant's cause of action has run").
 We exercise plenary review over a district court's dismissal of a complaint.  
See Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993); Napier v. Thirty or More 
Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1988).  Although we generally 
review dispositions of motions to intervene for abuse of discretion, Brody ex rel. 
Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992), the district court here did not 
exercise discretion in denying the motion to intervene, but barred the claims because of 
its legal conclusion that the statute of limitations had expired.  In these circumstances, 
we conduct plenary review.  See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 560 
(1974) ("In denying permission to intervene in this case, however, Judge Pence did not 
purport to weigh the competing considerations in favor of and against intervention, but 
simply found that the prospective intervenors were absolutely barred by the statute of 
limitations.  This determination was not an exercise of discretion, but rather a 
conclusion of law . . . ."). Similarly, "[w]e have plenary review of the district court's 
choice and interpretation of applicable tolling principles and its conclusion that the 
facts gave rise to a tolling of the statute of limitations."  Sheet Metal Workers, Local 
19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991).  Finally, our review of the 
district court's construction of Pennsylvania law is de novo.  Salve Regina College v. 
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Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) ("We conclude that a court of appeals should review 
novo a district court's determination of state law."); Grimes v. Vitalink Communications 
Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir.) ("The determinations regarding state law, where 
appropriate, will be reviewed de novo."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 480 (1994). 
III. 
 Because Congress did not establish a statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 
actions brought in federal court, federal district courts must "borrow" state laws of 
limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.  Board of Regents v. Tomanio
U.S. 478, 483-85 (1980) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and numerous cases).  Furthermore, "the 
practice of `borrowing' state statutes of limitations `logically include[s] rules of 
tolling.'"  Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 657 (1983) (citing Tomanio
485).  The parties agree that Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations applies to 
the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims here and that the running of the statute properly was tolled 
when the class action was filed.  The parties dispute, however, the duration of the 
tolling period applicable to claims of class members.   
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approves tolling the running of statutes of 
limitations while eligible class members are putative parties to a class action.  
Alessandro v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 409 A.2d 347, 350 n.9 (Pa. 1979).  The 
United States Supreme Court has held that such tolling protects both intervenors and 
purported class members who later file individual actions.  Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. 
Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 
(1974).0  The dispute here concerns when such tolling stops.  The defendants argue the 
                     
0Pa. R. Civ. P. 1701(a) defines a class action as, "[A]ny action brought by or against 
parties as representatives of a class until the court by order refuses to certify it as 
such or revokes a prior certification under these rules."  The 1977 Explanatory Note to 
the rule states that this definition becomes important in determining the effect of the 
commencement of a class action because it "carries into effect the decision [of 
Pipe, holding that] the commencement of an action as a class action suspends the 
applicable statute of limitations during the interim period from commencement until 
refusal to certify as to all putative members of the class . . . ."  
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tolling period ended when the district court denied certification of the class.  
Plaintiffs contend that tolling should have continued until the class representative's 
appeal of the denial was exhausted. 
 Plaintiffs seek to rely on a decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court that 
held tolling continued during the pendency of the class representative's appeal.  
v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 508 A.2d 1222, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).  The district court 
declined to follow the Miller panel, noting the different appellate procedures followed by 
Pennsylvania and federal courts.  Pennsylvania courts treat the denial of class 
certification as a final order from which an appeal may be taken immediately.  
409 A.2d at 350. Denial of class certification by a federal court, however, is 
interlocutory and ordinarily not immediately appealable.  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay
437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978).  Thus, in state court proceedings, there is some logic to 
continuing the tolling period while the certification decision is resolved.  But in 
federal court, such a continuation would result in a substantial extension of the tolling 
period.  The district court found that this distinction made application of the Superior 
Court's rule to cases in federal courts unreasonable.  We agree. 
 In deciding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would similarly credit this 
distinction, we observe that, in related contexts, Pennsylvania's highest court has 
weighed the policies warranting application of tolling periods to statutes of limitations 
against the risks of diluting those statutes. "Statutes of limitations embody important 
policy judgments that must be taken into account in determining the scope of application 
of the tolling principle."  Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 530 A.2d 407, 409 (Pa. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).  In Cunningham, the court found that filing a 
patently non-justiciable claim was not sufficient to toll the statute, noting:
To hold otherwise would be to render the statute of limitations so 
diluted in its effect as to skirt the clear legislative policy 
expressed therein, and would encourage plaintiffs to sleep on their 
rights in the hope that officious intermeddlers, who lack standing, 
will institute actions on their behalf. 
8 
Id. at 411. 
 We predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply parallel reasoning 
here, and conclude that to permit tolling the statute of limitations until final 
resolution on appeal of all claims would disable the essential purpose of the statute and 
encourage plaintiffs to sleep on their rights. Accordingly, we will affirm the district 
court's order dismissing the claims of Cocchi and Beddingfield and striking the motions of 
Dick and Zyskowski to intervene. 
IV. 
 Alternatively, Cocchi and Beddingfield assert they may evade the statute of 
limitations because, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), inclusion of their 
claims in the fourth amended complaint, filed five years after the demonstration and more 
than two years after expiration of the statute of limitations, should relate back to the 
filing date of the initial complaint.  We disagree.0    
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) permits amendment of a pleading to relate 
back to the date of the original pleading when: 
 (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the 
statute of limitations applicable to the action,0 or 
                     
0Because the district court did not address this argument in the opinion below, plaintiffs 
ask us to remand for consideration of the question.  We note, however, that the general 
rule that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below is 
one of discretion rather than jurisdiction. Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno
69 (3d Cir. 1983). We exercise that discretion here, noting that we may affirm the 
district court on any basis.  See, e.g., Felix v. Virgin Islands Government
57 (citing Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
870 (1980)). 
0This provision, added in 1991, was intended to make clear "that the rule does not apply 
to preclude any relation back that may be permitted under the applicable limitations law" 
of the jurisdiction that provides the statute of limitations.  3 James W. Moore et al., 
Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 15.15[3.-1] (2d ed. 1995) (quoting 1991 Advisory Committee 
Note).  According to the Advisory Committee Note, if the law providing the limitation 
"affords a more forgiving principle of relation back than the one provided in this rule, 
it should be available to save the claim." Pennsylvania does not provide a "more forgiving 
principle of relation back" than does federal practice.  See Aivazoglou v. Drever 
Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (adhering to the "well established rule 
that new parties cannot be introduced into a suit by amendment following expiration of the 
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 (2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempte
to be set forth in the original pleading, or 
 
 (3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party 
against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is 
satisfied and . . . the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has 
received such notice of the institution of the action that the party 
will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) 
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought 
against the party. . . . 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).0  Relying on Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 
1977), Cocchi and Beddingfield claim subparagraph (3) of Rule 15(c) allows the amendment, 
coming more than two years after expiration of the statute of limitations and naming them 
as plaintiffs, to relate back to the original action.0  But for appellants' claims to 
relate back, all three conditions specified in Rule 15(c)(3) must be satisfied. 
Appellants' argument fails because they have not demonstrated "a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party."   
 Statutes of limitations ensure that defendants are "protected against the 
prejudice of having to defend against stale claims, as well as the notion that, at some 
point, claims should be laid to rest so that security and stability can be restored to 
human affairs."  Cunningham, 530 A.2d at 409 (citations omitted).  In order to preserve 
this protection, the relation-back rule requires plaintiffs to show that the already 
commenced action sufficiently embraces the amended claims so that defendants are not 
unfairly prejudiced by these late-coming plaintiffs and that plaintiffs have not slept on 
their rights.   
                                                                  
period of the statute of limitations").  Accordingly, this subparagraph does not save 
appellants' case. 
0Under Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the question of relation back is procedural 
and therefore properly analyzed according to federal practice.  3 J. Moore, 
15.15[2]. 
0In Varlack, we held that replacement of a "John Doe" caption with a party's real name 
amounted to "changing a party," warranting application of Rule 15(c).  Varlack v. SWC 
Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1977). 
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 Where the effort is to add new parties, courts apply subparagraph (3), and 
inquire whether the defendants (A) received such notice that they will not be prejudiced 
in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a 
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
with the original claims.0    
 The emphasis of the first prong of this inquiry is on notice.  "[T]he 
`prejudice' to which the Rule refers is that suffered by one who, for lack of timely 
notice that a suit has been instituted, must set about assembling evidence and 
constructing a defense when the case is already stale."  Curry v. Johns-Manville Corp.
F.R.D. 623, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Because Cocchi and Beddingfield allege injury by the same 
conduct described in the original pleading, the evidence relevant to a defense against 
these new claims would be the same as the evidence relevant to a defense against the 
original claims. Hence, Cocchi and Beddingfield satisfy the first prong of Rule 15(c).
 On the second prong, however, the new complaint fails. Defendants did not know, 
nor should they have known before the expiration of the limitations period that, but for a 
mistake, they would have been sued directly by these plaintiffs.  The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit has noted that without some limit relation back: 
would allow the tardy plaintiffs to benefit from the diligence of the 
other victims and, more importantly, could cause defendants' liability 
to increase geometrically and their defensive strategy to become far 
more complex long after the statute of limitations had run.  Even if, 
as here, there were no showing of specific prejudice in the sense of 
lost or destroyed evidence, defendants would still be deprived of 
their interest in repose.  At some point, defendants should have 
notice of who their adversaries are. 
                     
0The Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment to the rule advises,  
 
 The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not 
expressly treated in revised Rule 15(c) since the problem is generally 
easier [than that of amendments changing defendants].  Again the chief 
consideration of policy is that of the statute of limitations, and the 
attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward change of defendants 
extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs. 
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Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1982).0  Cocchi and 
Beddingfield had ample time -- the time dictated by the relevant statute plus the generous 
period of time during which the statute was tolled -- in which to file their claims.  It 
is not disputed that Cocchi and Beddingfield were aware of their right to bring these 
claims.  Nevertheless, they failed to add their names to the complaint until after 
expiration of the statute of limitations.  They have not demonstrated that this failure 
was due to mistake. 
 Although the relation-back rule ameliorates the effect of statutes of 
limitations, 6A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
1497, it does not save the claims of complainants who have sat on their rights.  Here, 
Cocchi and Beddingfield seek to take advantage of the rule to perform an end
the statute of limitations that bars their claims.  We will affirm the district court's 
dismissal of their claims. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the district court's dismissal of the 
claims of Cocchi and Beddingfield and its order striking the motion to intervene of Dick 
and Zyskowski. 
 
                     
0This is not a case where plaintiffs merely sought to substitute a real party in interest.  
See  Staren v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1976) ("The 
substitution of such parties after the applicable statute of limitations may have run is 
not significant when the change is merely formal and in no way alters the known facts and 
issues on which the action is based.");  6A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Practice and Procedure § 1501 (1990) (citing cases permitting amendments that substitute 
new plaintiffs to relate back if the added plaintiffs are real parties in interest).  The 
Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 15 noted the relevance of Rule 
17(a), authorizing substitution of real parties in interest, to Rule 15(c).  But the 
Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 17(a) cautioned that the provision permitting 
substitution of plaintiffs should not be "misunderstood or distorted.  It is intended to 
prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an 
understandable mistake has been made." Neither condition is met here.  
